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Abstract We propose a new cross-linguistic constraint on the relationship between
the meaning of a clause-embedding predicate when it takes an interrogative com-
plement and its meaning when it takes a declarative complement. According to
this proposal, every clause-embedding predicate V satisfies a constraint that we
refer to as P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT. That is, for any exhaustivity-neutral interrogative
complement Q, if there is an answer p to Q such that px Vs pq, then it follows that
px Vs Qq. We discuss empirical advantages of this proposal over existing proposals
and explore potential counterexamples to P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT.
Keywords: clause-embedding predicates, cross-linguistic semantics, linguistic universals.
1 Introduction
A central question in semantics is whether there are any universal constraints on
the possible denotations of lexical items of certain grammatical categories. This
question has been investigated most prominently in the domain of determiners. For
instance, it has been proposed that all determiners are ‘conservative’ and that all
monomorphemic determiners are ‘monotonic’ (Barwise & Cooper 1981).
Recent work has explored semantic universals in the domain of clause-embedding
predicates like know, agree, and wonder (Spector & Egré 2015; Theiler, Roelofsen
& Aloni 2018; Uegaki 2019; Steinert-Threlkeld 2020). Within this line of work,
two basic questions can be distinguished. The first is empirical: Which constraints,
if any, do we find in the semantics of clause-embedding predicates? The second
is theoretical: What may explain such universal semantic constraints? The present
paper is primarily concerned with the first question.
More specifically, we will consider a number of recent proposals which put
forward possible constraints that relate the meaning of a clause-embedding predicate
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Constraints on clause-embedding predicates
when it takes an interrogative complement to its meaning when it takes a declarative
complement (Spector & Egré 2015; Theiler et al. 2018; Uegaki 2019). We will
identify counterexamples for each of these proposals, and will formulate a new
constraint, P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, which rules in the counterexamples to existing
proposals and yet rules out many conceivable denotations which have so far not
been attested in cross-linguistic research.
The paper is structured as follows. §2 discusses existing proposals, §3 evaluates
these, and §4 introduces P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT. §5 discusses a number of empirical
observations in recent cross-linguistic work which suggest potential counterexamples
to the proposed constraint, though in each case further empirical work is needed to
establish the exact status of the relevant constructions. §6 concludes.
2 Existing proposals
2.1 Verdical Uniformity
Spector & Egré (2015) (henceforth, S&E) propose that all responsive clause-
embedding predicates (that is, predicates that take both declarative and interrogative
complements) are ‘uniform w.r.t. veridicality’. To spell out what this means, let us
first recall when a predicate is veridical w.r.t. declarative/interrogative complements.
A predicate V is veridical w.r.t. declarative complements if and only if for every
declarative complement p:
(1) px Vs pq ⇒ ppq
For instance, know is veridical because:
(2) Mary knows that Bill left ⇒ Bill left
Veridicality w.r.t. interrogative complements is somewhat more involved. We follow
Theiler et al. (2018) in defining this notion in terms of so-called exhaustivity-neutral
interrogative complements. Interrogative complements often allow for multiple
readings that differ in the level of exhaustivity (non-exhaustive, weakly exhaustive,
intermediate exhaustive, strongly exhaustive). Exhaustivity-neutral interrogative
complements are ones for which all these readings coincide. They include polar
interrogatives like pwhether Bill leftq, as well as wh-interrogatives with a uniqueness
presupposition such as pwhich boy leftq. For such exhaustivity-neutral interrogative
complements it is clear which propositions contain precisely enough information to
resolve the issue expressed by the interrogative. We refer to declarative complements
expressing such propositions as answers. For instance, the answers to pwhether Bill
leftq are pthat Bill leftq and pthat Bill didn’t leaveq.
A predicate V is veridical w.r.t. interrogative complements if and only if for
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every exhaustivity-neutral interrogative complement Q and any answer p to Q:
(3) px Vs Qq & ppq ⇒ px Vs pq
For instance, know is veridical w.r.t. interrogative complements because:1
(4) Mary knows whether Bill left & Bill left ⇒ Mary knows that Bill left
A responsive predicate is uniform w.r.t. veridicality if and only it is either veridical
w.r.t. both declarative and interrogative complements, or non-veridical w.r.t. both
declarative and interrogative complements. S&E propose the following generaliza-
tion:
(5) VERIDICAL UNIFORMITY
All responsive predicates are uniform w.r.t. veridicality.
Note that know is indeed uniform w.r.t. veridicality. As an example of a predicate
that does not satisfy this property, S&E consider the fictitious verb shknow, meaning
‘know’ when taking a declarative complement and ‘wonder’ when taking an inter-
rogative complement. shknow would be veridical w.r.t. declarative complements, but
not w.r.t. interrogative complements. VERIDICAL UNIFORMITY predicts that such
predicates do not exist in any language.
2.2 Clausal distributivity
Theiler et al. (2018) consider another constraint on clause-embedding predicates,
which is formulated in terms of a property they refer to as ‘clausal distributivity’
(c-distributivity for short). A clause-embedding predicate V is c-distributive just in
case for any exhaustivity-neutral interrogative complement Q:
1 As pointed out in Theiler et al. 2018, if we had not restricted ourselves to exhaustivity-neutral
complements in the definition of veridicality w.r.t. interrogative complements, then know would
have been classified as non-veridical. To see this, consider the following example, in which the
complement has a salient non-exhaustive (mention-some) reading.
(i) Rudolph knows where one can buy an Italian newspaper.
Suppose that Rudolph knows that one can get an Italian newspaper at Newstopia, and that he does
not falsely believes that one can get Italian newspapers elsewhere. Further suppose that in fact Italian
newspapers are sold both at Newstopia and at Paperworld. Then, on the one hand, (i) is true on a
non-exhaustive reading. On the other hand, that one can get an Italian newspaper at Paperworld is
an answer to the embedded interrogative (still assuming a non-exhaustive reading). But (ii) is false,
violating the requirement for veridicality w.r.t. interrogative complements.
(ii) Rudolph knows that one can buy an Italian newspaper at Paperworld.
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(6) px Vs Qq ⇔ there is an answer p to Q such that px Vs pq
For instance, know is c-distributive since pJo knows whether Sue leftq is true if and
only if pJo knows that Sue leftq or pJo knows that Sue didn’t leaveq is true. On
the other hand, shknow is not c-distributive since pJo shknows whether Sue leftq
does not imply that either pJo shknows that Sue leftq or pJo shknows that Sue didn’t
leaveq is true (in fact, it implies that both are false).
(7) C-DISTRIBUTIVITY
All responsive clause-embedding predicates are c-distributive.
Theiler et al. (2018) note that predicates of relevance (PoRs) such as care and matter
form counterexamples to both VERIDICAL UNIFORMITY and C-DISTRIBUTIVITY.
They are counterexamples to VERIDICAL UNIFORMITY because they are veridical
w.r.t. declaratives but not w.r.t. interrogatives. They are counterexamples to C-
DISTRIBUTIVITY since (8a) can be true without either (8b) or (8c) being true (Elliott,
Klinedinst, Sudo & Uegaki 2017):
(8) a. It matters to Jo whether Sue left.
b. It matters to Jo that Sue left.
c. It matters to Jo that Sue didn’t left.
Uegaki (2019) notes that it is the presuppositional component of predicates of
relevance that makes them counterexamples to C-DISTRIBUTIVITY. (8b) presup-
poses that Sue left and (8c) presupposes that Sue didn’t leave, while (8a) does not
guarantee that any of these presuppositions is satisfied. Uegaki proposes a variant
of C-DISTRIBUTIVITY which is formulated in terms of Strawson entailment (von
Fintel 1999) rather than plain entailment and thereby successfully rules in predi-
cates of relevance. The problems discussed below, however, apply to STRAWSON
C-DISTRIBUTIVITY just as much as they do to plain C-DISTRIBUTIVITY.
3 Problematic cases
3.1 Estonian mõtlema
Roberts (2018) presents a detailed investigation of the Estonian responsive clause-
embedding predicate mõtlema. When ϕ is a declarative complement, px mõtlema
ϕq has two possible readings. Under what we will call its ‘believe reading’ it simply
means that x believes ϕ . Under its ‘imagine reading’, on the other hand, it means
that x believes not-ϕ but imagines what the world would be like if ϕ were true.



















‘Liis thinks that it’s raining, but it isn’t raining.’
(10) Context: I am discussing with my friend what life would be like if an asteroid



























‘I’m thinking about dinosaurs still being alive, even though I know that they
aren’t.’
When ϕ is an interrogative complement, px mõtlema ϕq also has two possible
readings. Under the ‘wonder reading’ it means that x wonders what the answer to ϕ
is. On the other hand, under the ‘imagine reading’ it means that for some answer p
to ϕ , x believes not-p but imagines what the world would be like if p were true. The













‘I wonder who is at the door.’
(12) Context: Liis hears a knock at the door. She was expecting her friend Kirsi
to come over, but she fantasizes for just a moment all the famous celebrities

























‘Liis is thinking about who is at the door, even though she knows it’s Kirsi.’
To see that this predicate violates C-DISTRIBUTIVITY consider a context in which
(i) Mary believes neither that it is raining nor that it is not raining; and (ii) she wants
to know whether it’s raining. Now consider the following statements:
(13) a. Mary mõtlema whether it is raining.
b. Mary mõtlema that it is raining.
c. Mary mõtlema that it isn’t raining.
In the given context, according to Roberts’ empirical description, (13a) is true
(on the ‘wonder’ reading), (13b) is false (on either the ‘believe’ or the ‘imagine’
reading), and (13c) is false (on either the ‘believe’ or the ‘imagine’ reading). This
means that mõtlema violates C-DISTRIBUTIVITY. It also violates STRAWSON
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C-DISTRIBUTIVITY, as presuppositions do not play a role in the counterexample.
Roberts (2018) notes that mõtlema is not alone in this kind of behavior: similar
patterns can be observed with Estonian mõtisklema ‘consider’, vaatlema ‘observe’,
and meelisklema ‘muse’, as well as Finnish miettiä, a presumed cognate of mõtlema.
3.2 Japanese daroo
The Japanese sentence-final particle daroo, as analysed by Hara (2018) and Uegaki
& Roelofsen (2018), also constitutes a counterexample to C-DISTRIBUTIVITY. This
particle can have either a declarative or an interrogative prejacent. With a declarative







‘I think that Ken will sing.’
With an interrogative prejacent, its meaning is similar to wonder (a subtle difference







‘I wonder whether Ken will sing.’
To see that daroo violates C-DISTRIBUTIVITY consider a context in which Mary
would like to know whether Ken will sing (and doesn’t know yet). In such a context,
Mary can truthfully utter (15) but not (14), nor a variant of (14) in which the prejacent
is negated. This shows that daroo violates C-DISTRIBUTIVITY. Again, STRAWSON
C-DISTRIBUTIVITY is violated as well since presuppositions do not play a role here.
3.3 Inquisitive predicates
Inquisitive predicates like wonder and inquire also constitute a challenge for C-
DISTRIBUTIVITY, though at a somewhat different level than daroo and mõtlema.
Since wonder and inquire are rogative predicates—i.e., they only take interrogative
complements—we might simply assume that a constraint like C-DISTRIBUTIVITY
does not apply to such predicates, since the constraint makes reference to cases
in which the predicate combines with a declarative complement. In principle,
however, it would be preferable to think of the constraint as applying across clause-
embedding predicates, without making reference to selectional restrictions. And this
is possible if, following Ciardelli & Roelofsen (2015) and Uegaki (2015), we assume
that rogative predicates like wonder are of the same semantic type as responsive
predicates like know. For concreteness, consider the following entry:
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know *shknow care mõtlema daroo wonder
VERIDICAL UNIFORMITY X X 7 X X NA
C-DISTRIBUTIVITY X X 7 7 7 7
STRAWSON C-DISTRIBUTIVITY X X X 7 7 7
Table 1 Summary of the predictions of the three constraints discussed so far.
(16) JwonderKw = λQλx. DOXwx 6∈ Q ∧ INQwx ⊆ Q
where (i) we take a complement Q to denote a set of propositions, namely those
propositions that resolve the issue expressed by Q; (ii) DOXwx is the doxastic state of
x in w, that is, the set of worlds that x considers possible in w; and (iii) INQwx is the
inquisitive state of x in w, that is, the set of subsets of DOXwx in which the issues that
x entertains in w are resolved.
The entry says that px wonders ϕq is true in w just in case (i) x’s doxastic state is
not an element of the semantic value of ϕ , which means that it does not resolve the
issue expressed by ϕ , and (ii) x’s inquisitive state is contained in the semantic value
of ϕ , which means that x would like to reach a doxastic state which does resolve the
issue expressed by ϕ .
In principle, ϕ can be a declarative complement. In this case, however, the
two conjuncts in the entry for wonder always contradict each other. That is, the
entry predicts that, when ϕ is a declarative complement, px wonders ϕq is always
contradictory. Indeed, this is how the selectional restrictions of wonder are accounted
for in Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2015 and Uegaki 2015.
On such an account, it is possible to evaluate whether wonder satisfies C-
DISTRIBUTIVITY. And the answer is that it doesn’t. After all, px wonders Qq can
be true even if for every answer p to Q, px wonders pq is false. The latter, in fact,
holds for any p whatsoever. Again, the problem applies equally to STRAWSON
C-DISTRIBUTIVITY.
Interim summary The cases discussed so far are summarised in Table 1, where
X means ‘correct prediction’ and 7 means ‘incorrect prediction’.
4 Proposal
We have seen that previously proposed constraints on the denotations of clause-
embedding predicates face empirical challenges. We now formulate a new con-
straint, P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, which overcomes these empirical challenges. We
say that a clause-embedding predicate V is P-TO-Q ENTAILING if and only if for
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any exhaustivity-neutral interrogative complement Q, if there is an answer p to Q
such that px Vs pq, then it also holds that px Vs Qq.
(17) P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT
All clause-embedding predicates V are P-TO-Q ENTAILING.
P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT is weaker than (STRAWSON) C-DISTRIBUTIVITY since it is
limited to the direction from declarative-embedding to interrogative-embedding. Be-
cause of this, all predicates that satisfy the latter (e.g., know, predict, surprise) satisfy
the former as well. Moreover, as we will argue in Sections 4.2-4.5, P-TO-Q EN-
TAILMENT rules in attested predicates that are problematic for C-DISTRIBUTIVITY:
predicates of relevance, mõtlema, daroo, and inquisitive predicates. On the other
hand, P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT still rules out fictitious predicates like shknow. These
are discussed in Section 4.6. Before discussing these predictions in detail, we will
first provide a more precise formulation of P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT in Section 4.1.2
4.1 Formalization
We will provide a formalization of P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT in inquisitive semantics
(Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2018). A similar formalization could be
given in Hamblin semantics (Hamblin 1973). In both frameworks, declarative
and interrogative clauses are treated uniform. Specifically, the semantic value of a
clause ϕ , Jϕ K, is taken to be a set of propositions, no matter whether ϕ is declarative
or interrogative. In inquisitive semantics, Jϕ K is construed as the set of those
propositions that (a) resolve the issue that ϕ expresses (if any); and (b) do not
contain any possible worlds that are ruled out by the information that ϕ conveys
(if any). The set of propositions associated with a clause construed this way is
always downward closed. That is, if Jϕ K contains a proposition p then it must also
contain any stronger proposition q⊂ p.3 Below are examples of the denotations of
declarative and interrogative clauses in this framework:
2 P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT relates to VERIDICAL UNIFORMITY as follows. Any P-TO-Q ENTAILING
predicate that has the CHOICE PROPERTY, defined in (i) below, and is veridical w.r.t. interrogatives is
also veridical w.r.t. declaratives.
(i) A declarative-embedding predicate V has the CHOICE PROPERTY just in case for any two
mutually inconsistent declarative complements p and p′, x Vs that p and x Vs that p’ cannot
be true at the same time.
The proof of this is a straightforward adaptation of the one in Appendix B.3 of Theiler et al. 2018.
However, it is not the case that any P-TO-Q ENTAILING predicate that is veridical w.r.t. declaratives
is also veridical w.r.t. interrogatives. Counterexamples include predicates of relevance.
3 On this point, Hamblin semantics differs from inquisitive semantics. For comparison, see Roelofsen
2013; Ciardelli, Roelofsen & Theiler 2017; Ciardelli & Roelofsen 2017.
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(18) a. Jthat Ann leftK = {{w | Ann left in w}}↓
b. Jwhether Ann leftK =
{
{w | Ann left in w} ,
{w | Ann didn’t leave in w}
}↓
where Q↓ := {q | q⊆ p for some p ∈ Q}
We will often refer to the maximal elements of Jϕ K as the alternatives expressed
by ϕ . These propositions contain precisely enough information to resolve the issue
expressed by Jϕ K. For any set of propositions Q we write alt(Q) for the set of
maximal elements of Q:
(19) alt(Q) := { p ∈ Q | there is no q ∈ Q such that p⊂ q}.
With this background, we can formally define P-TO-Q ENTAILING predicates and
the P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT constraint as follows:4
(20) A predicate V of type 〈〈st, t〉,et〉 is P-TO-Q ENTAILING if and only if for
any term x and any exhaustivity-neutral Q:
there is a p ∈ alt(Q) such that JV K({p}↓)(x) =⇒ JV K(Q)(x)
(21) P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT
All predicates of type 〈〈st, t〉,et〉 are P-TO-Q ENTAILING.
In the next four subsections, we will show that the predicates that are problematic
for previously proposed constraints, i.e. predicates of relevance, mõtlema, daroo and
wonder, satisfy P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT as formulated in (20)-(21).
4.2 Predicates of relevance
For concreteness, we will focus on one predicate of relevance, namely care. The
discussion below equally applies to other predicates of relevance.
First we note that care empirically satisfies P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, since all
variants of (22a) entail (22b).
(22) a. Ann cares that Peter left. b. Ann cares (about) which boy left.
Next we consider a formal analysis of care, and check whether that satisfies
P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT as well. We adopt the lexical entry in (23), based on Elliott
et al. 2017 and Theiler et al. 2018:
4 Here, we give an inquisitive semantic treatment of complements (with type 〈st, t〉), but a traditional
treatment of matrix sentential denotations (type t). This is merely for expository purposes.
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(23) JcareKw = λQλx : DOXwx ⊆
⋃
Q. ∃p ∈ alt(Q) : BOUwx ⊆ p∨BOUwx ∩ p = /0
where BOUwx is the set of worlds compatible with x’s preferences in w.
This lexical entry successfully captures the fact that care violates C-DISTRIBUTIVITY
in the direction from interrogative-embedding to declarative-embedding, as discussed
in Section 2.2. Specifically, (23) captures the fact that (22b) has a very weak pre-
supposition (Ann believes that some boy left), while (22a) has a much stronger
presupposition (Ann believes that Peter left). Because of this, (22b) can be true even
if, for no boy x, the presupposition of pAnn cares that x leftq is satisfied, leading to
the violation of C-DISTRIBUTIVITY.
On the other hand, the lexical entry in (23) predicts that care satisfies P-TO-Q
ENTAILMENT. This is so because, if there is an answer p to Q that satisfies the
presupposition and the assertion of px cares pq according to the analysis in (23), it
follows that the presupposition and the assertion of px cares Qq according to the
analysis in (23) are also satisfied.5
4.3 Daroo
Recall that the Japanese particle daroo means ‘think’ when it takes a declarative
prejacent and something similar to ‘wonder’ when it takes an interrogative prejacent.
Hara (2018) and Uegaki & Roelofsen (2018) analyze daroo as follows, modulo some
details that are irrelevant here:
(24) JdarooKw = λQ〈st,t〉. INQwsp ⊆ Q (sp: the speaker)
Here, INQwsp is the inquisitive state of the speaker in w, also employed in the analysis
of wonder in (16). That is, it is the set of subsets of DOXwsp in which the issues that
the speaker entertains in w are resolved. Thus, according to (24), ϕ-daroo means that
the speaker would like to reach a doxastic state which resolves the issue expressed
by ϕ . We first motivate this analysis of daroo empirically, and then move on to show
that it satisfies P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT.
(24) captures the fact that p-daroo, with a declarative prejacent p, simply means




sp (see Uegaki & Roelofsen 2018):
(25) Jp darooKw = 1 iff INQwsp ⊆ {p}↓ iff DOXwsp ⊆ p
5 More formally, for any term x and any exhaustivity-neutral Q, the following holds: Suppose there
is a p ∈ alt(Q) s.t. JcareKw({p}↓)(x). Given (23), this is true iff (i) DOXwx ⊆ p and (ii) BOUwx ⊆
p∨BOUwx ∩ p = /0. Now, because p ∈ alt(Q), (i) entails the presupposition of JcareKw(Q)(x), i.e.,
DOXwx ⊆
⋃
Q. On the other hand, (ii) entails the assertion of JcareKw(Q)(x), i.e., ∃p ∈ alt(Q) :
BOUwx ⊆ p∨BOUwx ∩ p = /0. Hence, (i) and (ii) together entail JcareKw(Q)(x).
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On the other hand, with an interrogative prejacent Q, Q-daroo is predicted to mean
that the speaker entertains the issue represented by Q:
(26) JQ darooKw = 1 iff INQwsp ⊆ Q
This is an empirically accurate analysis of the interpretations of daroo.
The entry in (24) satisfies P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT as formulated in (21). This is
so because, for any exhaustivity-neutral Q, if there is an answer p to Q such that
pp-darooq is true, it follows that pQ-darooq is also true.6
We have stated that daroo roughly means ‘wonder’ when it takes an interrogative
complement. However, the analysis in (24) is crucially different from that of wonder-
Q according to the semantics we have given above in (16), repeated here:
(27) Jwonder QKw = λx. DOXwx 6∈ Q ∧ INQwx ⊆ Q
The crucial difference is that daroo lacks the ignorance component, DOXwx 6∈ Q,
which is part of the semantics of wonder. The lack of the ignorance component in



































‘At what temperature does water boil at the top of Mt. Fuji? Since the air
pressure there is about 2/3 of the ground level, it boils at about 87.7°C.’
Here, the author/speaker uses Q-daroo to introduce the question Q as a topic, which
she in fact knows the answer to. This suggests that Q-daroo does not semantically
entail the speaker’s ignorance about Q.7 This is in contrast to the behavior of wonder,
which is infelicitous in a similar context:
(29) #I wonder at what temperature water boils at the top of Mt. Fuji. Since the
air pressure there is about 2/3 of the ground level, it boils at about 87.7°C.
The lack of the ignorance component furthermore captures the fact that daroo is
responsive, i.e., compatible with both declarative and interrogative prejacents. If
6 More formally: suppose there is a p ∈ alt(Q) s.t. JdarooKw({p}↓). Then, by (24), we have
that INQwsp ⊆ {p}↓. This entails INQwsp ⊆ Q since p ∈ alt(Q). Hence, JdarooKw({p}↓) entails
JdarooKw(Q).
7 Although Q-daroo may pragmatically implicate ignorance as a result of competition with p-daroo,
where p is a specific answer of Q, as suggested in Uegaki & Roelofsen 2018.
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daroo carried the ignorance component in its semantics, we would expect it to be
rogative just like wonder, i.e., be incompatible with declarative prejacents due to the
predicted contradiction in meaning.
4.4 Mõtlema
As discussed above, Roberts (2018) gives the following empirical description of the
behavior of mõtlema.
(30) When ϕ is declarative, px mõtlema ϕq means that (a) x believes that ϕ is
true; or that (b) x believes not-ϕ but imagines what the world would be like
if ϕ were true.
(31) When ϕ is interrogative, px mõtlema ϕq means that (a) x wonders what the
answer to ϕ is; or (b) for some answer p to ϕ , x believes not-p but imagines
what the world would be like if p were true.
Staying close to this basic empirical description by Roberts (2018), we assume that
mõtlema has two interpretations: On its ‘daroo’ interpretation, it says that the subject
‘entertains’ the issue expressed by the complement (this yields the ‘believe’ reading
when the complement is declarative and the ‘wonder’ reading when the complement
is interrogative). On its ‘imagine’ interpretation, it says that there is an answer to
the issue expressed by the complement such that the subject believes its negation
and imagines what the world would be like if it were true. This is reflected in the
disjunctive lexical entry below, where IMGwx is the set of worlds that are compatible
with what x imagines in w.8
8 Roberts (2018) proposes an analysis of mõtlema that aims at unifying all its readings by making
reference to what he calls the CONTEMPLATION STATE of the subject. The contemplation state of an
agent is defined as a set of questions (each modelled as a partition of a set of contextually relevant
possible worlds). These questions are ones that are ‘under active consideration’ by the agent. The
semantics of mõtlema is then proposed to be as follows:
(i) JmõtlemaKw = λQλx. Q ∈ CONTwx (where CONTwx : the contemplation state of x in w)
Roberts assumes a semantics of clausal complements similar to that of inquisitive semantics, but
without downward closure.
While this proposal may be a possible starting point, we believe that it would have to be further
articulated in order to make clear predictions. In particular, what needs further elaboration is what it
means for a (possibly singleton) set of propositions to be ‘under active consideration’ by an agent.
For instance, if a certain question Q is in the contemplation state of an agent x, does it follow that
every sub-question of Q is also in x’s contemplation set? Or that every singleton subset of Q (each
corresponding to an exhaustive resolution) is in x’s contemplation set? Or, perhaps, that at least two
of these singleton subsets are (in case Q is not a singleton to begin with)? For the account to make






INQwx ⊆ Q ∨
‘imagine’︷ ︸︸ ︷
∃p ∈ alt(Q) : DOXwx ⊆ p∧ IMGwx ⊆ p
Having fixed this semantic analysis of mõtlema, we can now ask whether it is P-
TO-Q ENTAILING. Suppose that Q is an exhaustivity-neutral question and p an
answer to Q such that px mõtlema pq is true. On the ‘daroo’ reading, this means that
INQwx ⊆ {p}↓ (x believes p). But then px mõtlema Qq is true as well on the daroo
reading. On the ‘imagine’ reading, it means that x does not believe p but imagines
what the world would be like if p were the case. Then it follows that px mõtlema Qq
is true as well on the imagine reading. So, indeed, mõtlema is P-TO-Q ENTAILING.
4.5 Wonder
Finally, wonder as analyzed below, repeated from §3.3 above, satisfies P-TO-Q
ENTAILMENT as well.
(33) JwonderKw = λQ〈st,t〉λxe. DOXwx 6∈ Q ∧ INQwx ⊆ Q
This is so since JwonderKw({p}↓)(x) is false for any x and p. This means that
P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT is trivially satisfied.
4.6 Non-attested predicates
We have seen that P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT rules in the predicates that pose challenges
for previously proposed constraints. At the same time, it is still significant in that it
rules out many conceivable but non-attested predicates.
Consider first the predicate in (34), meaning ‘consider all possibilities open’:
(34) Jall-openKw = λQλx. ∀p ∈ alt(Q) : DOXwx ∩ p 6= /0
This predicate violates P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, because it is possible for DOXwx to
be compatible with some p ∈ alt(Q) without being compatible with all p ∈ alt(Q).
To our knowledge, this prediction is correct, i.e., no language lexicalizes (34).
More generally, this seems true for all predicates that quantify universally over the
alternatives in the denotation of their complement. This (prima facie unexpected)
general restriction is predicted by P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT.
Next, consider the following fictitious predicate from Steinert-Threlkeld 2020,
where info(Q) :=
⋃
Q denotes the informative content of Q.
pursue, but we do not see at this point how it could be done in such a way that the reported readings
could be captured in a fully uniform way. Therefore, for now, we specify a semantics for mõtlema
which, while capturing all the reported readings, is not fully uniform.
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(35) JwondowsKw = λQλx.
(
w ∈ DOXwx ∧ DOXwx ⊆ info(Q) ∧
∀p ∈ alt(Q) : DOXwx ∩ p 6= /0
)
Steinert-Threlkeld (2020) describes this predicate as roughly meaning know when
taking a declarative complement, while meaning be uncertain when taking an
interrogative complement. The first and the second requirement posed by wondows
are that x’s doxastic state does not rule out the actual world w and that it supports the
informative content of Q. The third requirement corresponds to that posed by all-
open. wondows is therefore ruled out by P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT on similar grounds
as all-open: a belief state may, besides being truthful and supporting info(Q), be
compatible with some p ∈ alt(Q) without being compatible with all p ∈ alt(Q).
We now turn to shknow, the fictitious predicate considered by Spector & Egré
(2015). One way to formulate the lexical entry of shknow is as follows:
(36) JshknowKw = λQλx.
(
w ∈ DOXwx ∧ DOXwx ⊆ info(Q) ∧
∀p ∈ alt(Q) : DOXwx ∩ p 6= /0 ∧ INQwx ⊆ Q
)
Note that the first three requirements are those of wondows (encoding knowledge
when combined with a declarative complement and uncertainty when combined with
an interrogative complement). The fourth requirement adds an essential component
of the meaning of wonder, namely that the subject wants to reach an epistemic
state in which the issue expressed by the complement is resolved. This predicate
also violates P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, still essentially because of the requirement
stemming from all-open.
We should note that the all-open requirement forces a very strong level of
ignorance (compatibility with all alternatives). Intuitively, it is possible for x to
wonder, say, who won the race, even if x can already rule out some possible winners
(see Cremers, Roelofsen & Uegaki 2019 for relevant experimental results). Given
that shknow is intended to mean wonder when taking an interrogative complement,
one may want to adapt the entry in (36), so as to make room for a weaker ignorance
requirement. One way to do so is as in (37).9
(37) JshknowKw = λQλx.
(
(|alt(Q)|=1∧DOXwx ∈ Q) ∨
(|alt(Q)|6=1∧ DOXwx 6∈ Q ∧ INQwx ⊆ Q
)
Under this analysis, shknow still violates P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT. This is because, for
9 Note that the entry in (37) makes explicit reference to the cardinality of alt(Q). As far as we can see,
it is not possible to achieve the same result without making such reference to |alt(Q)|. We suspect
that there may be a universal constraint on the denotation of clause-embedding predicates which
prohibits such irreducible reference to |alt(Q)|, but we leave open here how such a constraint should
be formulated exactly and how it would be tested.
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any Q and any p ∈ alt(Q), if JshknowKw({p}↓)(x) is true, then JshknowKw(Q)(x) is
false due to the weak ignorance requirement that applies when it takes an interroga-
tive complement (shown within a rectangle).
Finally, let us consider the fictitious predicate knopinion, discussed in Steinert-
Threlkeld 2020. Intuitively, this predicate means know when taking an interrogative
complement and be opinionated when taking a declarative complement. Steinert-
Threlkeld (2020) gives the following lexical entry:
(38) JknopinionKw = λQλx.w ∈ DOXwx ∧ (DOXwx ∈ Q∨DOXwx ∈ ¬¬Q)
where ¬¬Q := { p | ∀q ∈ Q : q∩ p = /0}
To see that this predicate does not satisfy P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, suppose that Mary
truly believes that Bill did not win the race but doesn’t know who did. Then, (39) is
true while (40) is false.
(39) Mary knopinions that Bill won the race. true
(40) Mary knopinions which athlete won the race. false
So we have found a subject x, an exhaustivity-neutral Q and an answer p to Q such
that px knopinions pq is true while px knopinions Qq is false. This means that
P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT is violated.
5 Potential counterexamples
So far, we have considered attested and non-attested predicates for which P-TO-Q
ENTAILMENT makes correct predictions. In this section, we highlight some potential
counterexamples to our proposal from Buryat, Turkish, Tagalog and English.
5.1 Buryat hanaxa and Turkish bil
Bondarenko (2019) investigates the clause-embedding predicate hanaxa ‘think/recall’
in Buryat. When combining with a declarative complement, hanaxa is non-veridical,





















‘Dugar thought that a cat ate fish, but the cat didn’t eat fish.’
But when combined with an interrogative complement, the predicate is veridical, as
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‘I am recalling (the true answer to the question) whether Badma smokes.’
This sentence does not just convey that the speaker recalls some answer to the
question, but that she recalls the true answer. This means that (43a) can be true
without (43b) being true, suggesting that hanaxa violates P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT.
(43) a. Mary hanaxa that Bill left. b. Mary hanaxa whether Bill left.
However, Bondarenko (2019) argues that hanaxa combines with declarative and
interrogative complements in different ways. Specifically, interrogative complements
fill an argument slot of the predicate, while declarative complements function as
modifications of the event description that the predicate is part of (Kratzer 2006;
Moulton 2009). Under this account, the empirical observations made so far are
compatible with the assumption that hanaxa satisfies P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT (as it
reduces to the cases of inquisitive predicates, i.e., those predicates that cannot take a
declarative clause as their argument).
Özyıldız (2019) reports that the predicate bil in Turkish has a profile similar to
hanaxa in Buryat. A more comprehensive investigation would be needed in order to
fully understand how these predicates interact with interrogative complements and
whether they constitute counterexample to P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT.
5.2 Tagalog magtaka
The Tagalog predicate magtaka is translated as surprise when it takes a declarative






























‘Sara wondered who arrived.’
A preliminary investigation suggests that (44) does not imply (45). This would mean
that the predicate violates P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT. We must leave a more in-depth
10 We are grateful to Henrison Hsieh and Florinda Palma Gil for discussing this case with us and
providing native speaker judgments.
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investigation of this case for future work.
5.3 Explain
Pietroski (2000) and Elliott (2016) argue that when explain takes a declarative
complement, this complement does not describe the ‘explanandum’—what is being
explained—but rather the content of the explanation, i.e., the ‘explanans’. See (46):
(46) a. Bill asked Mary why she wanted to leave.
b. Mary explained that she wasn’t feeling well.
(46b) does not report that Mary was explaining the fact that she wasn’t feeling well.
Rather, she explained why she wanted to leave. The content of the explanation was
that she wanted to leave because she wasn’t feeling well. By contrast, if explain takes
an interrogative complement, this complement always describes the explanandum
rather than the content of the explanation.
(47) Mary explained how she was feeling.
This sentence reports that Mary gave an explanation of her feelings, not that she
described her feelings in order to explain something else, e.g., why she wanted
to leave. Based on these examples, it may seem that explain violates P-TO-Q
ENTAILMENT. After all, (46b) does not entail (47). The former conveys that Mary
explained why she wanted to leave, namely because she wasn’t feeling well. But
this does not entail that she gave an explanation of her feelings.
However, before concluding that explain violates P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, we first
have to better understand how the verb combines with declarative and interrogative
complements. The discussion in Elliott 2016 is relevant here, although it does not
contrast declarative complements with interrogative ones, but rather declarative
complements with DP arguments, as in (48).
(48) Mary explained the fact that she wasn’t feeling well.
In this sentence, the DP argument of the verb describes the explanandum, just like
in (47), rather than the content of the explanation. To derive the contrast between
cases like (46b) and (48), Elliott (2016) suggests that declarative complements are
modifiers of an event description, while DPs are thematic arguments. If an account of
the contrast between (46b) and (48) on the bases of such a combinatorial difference is
on the right track, then it may be extended to capture the contrast between (46b) and
(47) as well, in a way similar to how declarative and interrogative complements of
hanaxa are treated in Bondarenko 2019. We would have to assume that interrogative
complements, like DPs, fill an argument slot of the verb. Whatever fills this argument
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*shknow *knopinion care mõtlema daroo wonder
VERIDICALITY UNIFORMITY X X 7 X X NA
C-DISTRIBUTIVITY X X 7 7 7 7
STRAWSON C-DISTRIBUTIVITY X X X 7 7 7
P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT X X X X X X
Table 2 Summary of the predictions of the constraints considered in the paper
slot always describes the explanandum, not the content of the explanation. On such
an account, the fact that (46b) fails to entail (47) does not imply that explain violates
P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT. In (46b) the predicate does not take the declarative clause as
its argument. Only clauses that describe the explanandum (rather than the explanans)
fill the argument slot of the predicate.11
6 Conclusion
We have discussed a number of issues for recently proposed constraints on the
possible denotations of clause-embedding predicates. We have also proposed a new
constraint, P-TO-Q ENTAILMENT, which overcomes these issues. A summary of the
predictions made by the constraints discussed in this paper is given in Table 2.
Much work remains to be done, however. In particular, we have highlighted a
number of potential counterexamples which need to be investigated in further detail
and might require further revisions of the constraint we have proposed.
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